
A wall around China’s labs, and a window for Europe?
Washington is moving to choke off U.S. investment in Chinese biotech. For European companies already building pipelines on Chinese science, the squeeze could be an opening, but a narrow one, says long-time China expert Franck Le Deu.
Washington is moving to choke off U.S. investment in Chinese biotech. For European companies already building pipelines on Chinese science, the squeeze could be an opening, but a narrow one, says long-time China expert Franck Le Deu.
Washington is trying to slow the flow of American money and know-how into Chinese biotech, and it keeps adding tools. The newest is the Biotech Investment National Security Act (BINSA), introduced by Representatives John Moolenaar and Debbie Dingell, which would put U.S. pharmaceutical licensing deals, joint ventures and equity investments with Chinese partners under Treasury Department review. It follows the BIOSECURE Act, which became law in December 2025 and bars U.S. federal agencies from buying from or funding work that relies on a handful of named Chinese biotech firms, and the COINS Act, which screens U.S. outbound investment in sensitive foreign sectors. BINSA would expand that framework to biotechnology.
The money behind the crackdown
It’s the scale of the money that has Washington worried. By the account of Representatives John Moolenaar and Debbie Dingell, the lawmakers behind BINSA, cross-border biopharma licensing reached about $136 billion in potential value in 2025, up from less than $5 billion in 2020.
Figures from the intelligence firm Evaluate, cited by Fierce Biotech, show the average upfront payment on a Western-Chinese licensing deal rising 230% in four years, from $52 million in 2022 to $172 million in early 2026.
Bristol Myers Squibb alone signed a $15.2 billion co-development deal for early-stage molecules with China’s Hengrui Pharmaceuticals. Moolenaar says he wants to stop American investment from handing “Chinese companies another chokehold over our economy.” But some U.S. investors argue that restricting ties with Chinese biotech could simply redirect those opportunities elsewhere. In a widely shared essay for RA Capital, investors Peter Kolchinsky and Tess Cameron argue that walling off China would simply hand the opening to Europe, through what they call “Eurowashing,” “whereby European companies re-route the development of China-invented medicines through Europe,” capturing profits that would otherwise flow to American firms.
Europe’s wider window
So does the squeeze hand Europe an opening? Franck Le Deu, who led McKinsey’s China life sciences practice and is now managing partner of KerZheng Ventures, where he advises senior biopharma teams on the China-West dynamic, as well as a venture partner at the new fund Aulis Capital, sees the U.S. pressure opening “a wider window to Europe,” though he cautions that a genuine European third pole is still an aspiration.
He is skeptical that the U.S. measures will hurt China much. “The impact of those measures on China is dubious and likely only temporary,” he says. “Like putting car brakes on a bullet train.” China remains the main supplier of active pharmaceutical ingredients to the U.S., he notes, a card Beijing could play “if the U.S. pushed too far on decoupling.” What Washington’s moves mainly generate, he argues, is “signaling and uncertainty.”
On the ground, the industry is moving before politics does. Companies “can see the opportunity and are starting to act on it,” he says, though they remain “very much driven by their future U.S. exposure.” Politicians are more ambiguous, he says, wary of being exploited by China once again, and finding it hard to separate emotion from hard truths.
He points to Europe’s carmakers, now partnering with Chinese firms and even building Chinese cars on European soil, as a precedent, “a late and painful one.” The catch, he adds, is that “the car market is less global in nature” than pharma.
The Windward test
One European company already living the model is Windward Bio. The Basel-based firm raised $165 million this year in a round led by OrbiMed, with RA Capital, Janus Henderson and Sanofi Ventures, taking it to around $365 million raised since it launched in early 2025. Its pipeline, led by WIN378, a long-acting anti-TSLP antibody heading into Phase 3, comes largely from licensing deals with Chinese companies, including Kelun-Biotech and Harbour BioMed.
Is a company like that exposed if Washington keeps tightening? Le Deu does not know Windward’s contracts, and says the answer sits in the fine print. “Has the IP been transferred? Is manufacturing going to be out of mainland China? Is ownership majority Western? Are Phase 2 and beyond trials done ex-China?” If the only tie to China is the molecule and its early development, he says, it is “hard to see how this could be stopped.”
The deeper worry is whether Europe ends up repackaging Chinese molecules rather than inventing its own. Le Deu frames this as the real fear driving Washington. “How do you prevent 20 Chinese companies from iterating on what you publish, improve on it and beat you on speed to market? And price?” he asks. He calls it “a commoditisation of innovation trend that is real.” But there’s another side to it, he says. The current model reaches a shrinking share of the world’s population. “Will 90% of the population really agree to wait 15 years to get access to disruptive innovation that is life-changing? Of course not. Innovation has to become more affordable.”
A continent losing ground
Europe’s own weakness sharpens the stakes. Its share of global pharmaceutical sales has slipped to about 23%, against 55% for North America, and its share of clinical trials has fallen from 22% to around 12%. Le Deu is less concerned about the revenue figure, arguing that “a quarter of global revenues is still healthy and above Europe’s weight in the global economy.” The decline in clinical trials worries him more. Europe, he says, should be a leader in that area and still has room to recover: Spain is already gaining ground, and “if Australia can do it, why not some EU countries?”
Europe should “define a real vision for access to innovation” for its own population, translate it into goals for industry, and “recognise that isolation is not the answer.” For Le Deu, that means being “neither panda lovers, nor panda killers”: Europe should stay open to Chinese innovation while strengthening its own position by implementing the core recommendations of the EU Biotech Act on capital markets and regulation “at China speed.” For founders considering a Chinese asset, however, the question is more practical. Le Deu advises them to map ownership, manufacturing and data sources, then ask whether the asset can actually compete. In his view, that commercial question is “a bigger risk than posturing by regulators.”
The window Le Deu describes is real, but a narrow path. Whether Europe widens it depends less on what Washington does to China than on what Europe is finally willing to do for itself.


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